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preface
This Master's Thesis addresses the question,
"Was

William Edward Burghardt DuBois
in the strictest sense?"

pragmatic philosopher

a

In answering the question this

writer has had to refer to the traditions of philosophic
speculation as stated in coherence, correspondence, and

pragmatic theories.

The historical trends of past civil-

izations, which were brought to bear upon the conditions
of economies and politics faced by the nations of the

Renaissance period, and which lead directly to the New
World slave trade of the fifteenth century, had to be
examined.

In addition the history of the Afro-American

upon the North American continent had to be researched.
The need to address these wide ranging areas is based

upon my claim that the statement made in 1900, "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-

line," is DuBois' evaluation of information gathered in

studying periods of world civilizations. Western European
societial growth, and the history of the Black man.
Since the answers, i.e. answers to the questions which

must be settled if the problem of the color-line is to be
solved, are of great importance,

that the question,

question.

I

suggest in this Thesis

"What is true?" is an appropriate first

The discipline by which the question is addressed.

IV

and thus answered, will, in turn, inform all
answers which
that researcher offers.
Throughout the work of W.E.B. DuBois, we note that he continually turned his
attention to
the question,

"What is true?".

it is the central issue of

this Thesis that the discipline, which was demonstrated
by DuBois in addressing the question, is pragmatic and
that

DuBois was a pragmatic philosopher.
The work contained in the following pages is original

except where necessarily cited.

The suggestions and com-

ments, concerning earlier drafts of this Thesis, made to
me by the members of the Committee, have been candid, per-

spicacious and welcomed.

However, the final decision for

revision and editing has remained with this writer, and
this writer is responsible for mistake or foible found.
I

here offer special and heartfelt thanks to the Committee

Chairman, Gareth Matthews, for his quiet, yet demanding,
manner; his patience in the reading of even the very first

beginnings of this project.
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CHAPTER

I

THEORIES OF TRUTH
(The remarks which are contained in this Chapter
present a formal discussion of three well known theories
of truth, i.e. coherence, correspondence, and pragmatic
theories.
There is no reference made to W.E.B. DuBois
accepting or denying any one, all, or a part of these
theories.
The discussion which follows is intended to
suggest that if there are alternative formulations within
a
theory of truth, then, perhaps, there may be a
formulation of that same theory which has yet to be
discussed
.

Prominent among theories of truth are these:
1)
2)
3)

coherence theories;
correspondence theories;
pragmatic theories.

To be sure this list could be further extended.
Remarks
addressed to these theories of truth may best serve the
later examination of what I take to be W.E.B. DuBois'
theory of truth.
Common to these theories is the attempt
to state the conditions under which a statement is true.
I shall first present remarks addressing coherence theory.

Coherence Theory

Generally speaking the coherence theorist says that
to say of a statement that it is true is to say that that

statement coheres with

a

system of other statements.

For

example, it might be the case that a diamond is hard;
however, the statement that it is hard, if it is true, and

only if it is true, must cohere with the rest of my statements.

Historically Leibniz, Spinoza and Hegel have been

credited with positions of importance in philosophy because
of their attempts to construct formal systems which would

1

2

give insights into the nature of truth and the
principles
of philosophy.

All three have been credited, but not without

dispute, to be coherence theorists.

(These metaphysicians

are of particular interest to this paper for they were
read

and studied by DuBois, e.g. 1889-1890 DuBois was enrolled in

George Santayana's course offered at Harvard entitled:

Philosophy

6

-

Earlier French Philosophy, from Descartes to

Leibniz, and German Philosophy from Kant to Hegel.)

metaphysical supporters of

a

These

coherence theory suggest, in

various ways, that the truth of a statement comes to be known
from the nature of reasoning which
is known a priori.

assumes that the statement

To this end Leibniz offered his 'Monadology'

which suggested that the past, present and future of any
individual substance cohered within a system of "preestablished" harmony.

Leibniz claimed that "every individual

substance expresses the whole universe in its manner and in
its full concept are included all its experiences together

with all attendant circumstances and the whole sequence of

exterior events."'*'

Within such a system wherein individual

substances cohere according to a pre-established harmony,
or,

alternatively,

within a system which claims the coherence

of all is in the composition of one substance, there seems
to be little need to be concerned with temporal experience

and reality.

Yet a coherence theory does need to offer more

than a set of mutually consistent statements if it is to

provide

a

comprehensive theory of truth.

If the statements

3

Oj_

experience are to cohere within a system of statements,

then there is a connection of meaning and truth between the

statements of experience and statements which may be known
a

priori.

shall examine this point from two perspectives.

I

First,

I

address the following question, "What are the

consequences, as concerns statements of experience, when

coherence theory depends upon
priori?"

a

a

set of statements know a

An immediate result is that a statement of empirical

findings may be rejected, not because it fails to cohere with

other statements of experience, but rather because it fails
to cohere with statements which are independently accepted
to be true,

i.e.

a priori known. An example of this is the

statement, "The sun is the center of our immediate celestrial

system," which, in spite of its crudeness of expression, is

surely true.

The statement, however, was denied during

Galileo's time in favor of the claim that the earth was that
center.

The denial of the statement, 'the sun is the center

of the movement of the celestrial bodies most immediate to
us', was

based upon the accepted statements whose truths were

asserted to be known

a priori.

The second point to be discussed is this:

that even if

statements of necessary truth and statements of contingent
truth cohered, problems would arise when the distinction

between the coherence of meaning and truth of contingent
statements is compared to the meaning and truth of necessary
truths.

As a question it might read,

'what is the basis for

4

the claim that there is a connection of
meaning and truth

between the statements of experience and statements
known
a

priori?

'

There is a closeness in the relationship between

the meaning and truth of a priori statements in
mathematics

which is necessarily not transferable to the relationship

which holds between meaning and truth of statements of
experience.

The relationship of the former is one in which

the statements, e.g.

two is greater than one. are true in

virtue of the meaning of the words.

It is because the

meanings of the words are internally related as they are that
this statement, given as an example, is true.

Consider,

however, the truth of the statement, 'A 360° double slam-

dunk requires more ability than a one handed lay-up.'

The

truth of this statement is not dependent upon the relationship of statements known a priori

,

i.e.

the truth does not

depend upon the meaning of the terms '360° double slamdunk'

and 'one handed lay-up' being a priori known.

But

perhaps the most expedient means of addressing these worries

generated by the coherence theory is to discuss the coherence
theory's definition of truth.

This definition should then

detail the conditions by which a statement may be asserted
to be true,

i.e.
(1)

x is true =df

x coheres with other
statements or a maximal set of statements.

By definition, a statement is true if, and only if, it

coheres within

a

system.

What, it may be asked, are the

conditions required within this system for a statement to

5

be true?

Perhaps the system requires the statement to cohere

with other judgments.

The advantage of such a system, as

compared to a system which would admit only statements which
are known a priori, is that the meaning and truth of state-

ments are claimed to be analytic.

But to assert that analytic

statements are true because they cohere with one another,
and that they are true because of what the world is like, is

not to speak to the meaning of truth.
'A

Thus the statement,

diamond is hard', is true if it coheres within

of statements.

system

a

These statements, which make up the whole

conjunctively, may state facts, but for them to cohere they

must state facts which tell us how things are in similar
cases.
is hard,

The system which admits the statement,
'

'A

diamond

suggests a coherence based upon empirical evidence

that the objects which bear the predicate 'is hard' are

resistant to scratches.

Then this same system would also

include the statement that water is hard.

Water too is

resistant to scratches but these statements, if true, state
facts but make reference to two different types of cases.

And similarly we would find that statements which state
facts about the sum of the angles of a triangle would cohere
in spite of their assertions about different cases.

Take

the following as an example, 'the sum of angles in a triangle

drawn on a plane is 180°', while 'the sum of the angles of
a

triangle created by the intersection of three great circles

may be as large as 270°,'

6

The coherence theory of truth claims that truth
consists
in coherence,

i.e.

truth is the coherence of one statement

with another within a system.

That there may be several

systems which within themselves have statements which cohere
but that those same systems do not cohere with one another
is another of the worries directed against this theory.

An

additional worry rests with the criterion by which a state-

ment is said to cohere with some other statements.

If one

were to argue that statements are true in virtue of the
statements'

coherence with facts, this would be to move

beyond the theory presently considered.

However, if one

were to argue that the coherence of one statement to another
is accepted as a practical test of truth,

this could be

asserted only because there was at least one statement
judged to be independently true.

Thus the coherence theory

provides some insight into the difficulty of asserting
statements of the form "x is true" with any assurance, but
the theory settles few of the questions which address the

conditions by which a statement may be claimed true.

Correspondence Theory
When

we turn the discussion from the coherence theory

to a correspondence theory, we seek again the conditions

by which this theory determines that a statement is true.

Historically the correspondence theories have suggested that
there is a correspondence between thought and reality of

7

which the truth consists, i.e. there is
between belief and fact.

a

truth relationship

The early worry generated by the

Schoolmen's theory of correspondence may be summarized as
follows.

The Schoolmen claimed that a statement is true

when, and only when, the thing is as signified

2
.

If a

thing is claimed which is not so, then it is falsely claimed.

Conversely, if a thing is claimed which is so, then it is a
ture claim.

As a result the true claim is understood to be

directed to "what is" and a false claimed directed to "what
is not".

A correspondence theory by this may then suggest

that the truth of a statement is upheld or is defeated by
the relationship which the statement of belief holds to
fact.

But a false or erroneous statement of belief on this

first account suggests that to think of, or to have a thought
of, what is not is to think of or have a thought of nothing,

i.e.

it would be just not to think or just not to have a

thought.

This correspondence theory may be revised by

claiming that there is a relationship which exists between
The support which

beliefs, and mistaken beliefs, and facts.

this revision offers to the theory is of two types.

On the

one hand there is a category which allows objective facts
and objective falsehoods to be the objects of beliefs and

false beliefs respectively.

Additionally, this provides

that there may be two statements, i.e,
"

...

".

,

.

is", and,

is not", w hich may be said to correspond with each
7

fact of which only one is true.

These modifications

8

nonetheless offer little to clarify satisfactorily the
criteria by which the definition of "x is true" corresponds
to the facts of which the beliefs are held.

the truth of the statement

'4

+

4

=

8,

1

For example,

stands outside

the belief held of the statement, and the truth of the

relationship between the belief and fact is not dependent
upon the statement.

Bertrand Russell has addressed this

separation and distinction in saying, "the world contains
facts

,

which are what they are whatever we may choose to

think about them, and that there are also beliefs, which
have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are

either true or false".

3

A formulation of the correspondence theory's definition
of truth may be presented as follows:
x is true =df there is some fact,
such that f, corresponds to x.

(2)

f,

The correspondence suggested by this formulation is that

which holds between a statement and fact.

This relation-

ship of a statement corresponding to fact either holds or
it doesn't.

"A diamond is hard" in this interpretation

asserts that

'a

diamond is hard' is true, if, and only if,

there is a fact that corresponds to this statement, pre-

sumably the fact that a diamond is hard,

(Clearly this is

distinct from the coherence theory claim in which the truth
of the statement did not presuppose, nor did it attempt to

correspond to,

a fact,

proposition that

a

such as the fact asserted by the

diamond is hard.

Rather the coherence

9

theory only demanded that the statement cohere within some
system.)

However, an effective way of showing that the

correspondence relationship, asserted by formulation

(2)

of the correspondence theory's definition of truth, is not

clear is to demonstrate that the theory is not relieved of
the worries which arise from the liar paradox as presented
in the Epimenides

example.

'

sentence is not true."
not;

if it is not,

Consider the sentence "This

Is it true?

then it is.^

If it is,

Formulation

then it is
seems to

(2)

continually fall victim to this paradox for it asserts
that a particular relation, the relation of correspondence,

holds between any true sentence, and only true sentences,
and something real.

If it is the case that what we know

about an object of the real world is a fact, then it is in
this regard that a fact is that peculiar kind of thing which

mediates knowledge.

Thus to say that

'x is

make an assertion about a proposition.

which is spoken of as 'expressing

true'

is to

It is a proposition

a fact'

and facts are

expressed and regarded as a case of knowledge.

correspondence theory runs a rough course.

Herein the

This may be

highlighted by the following discussion.
The statement of which 'true' is predicated by the

correspondence theory, is defined as
(2)

x is true =df there is some fact,
such that f corresponds to x.

f,

We might then ask of the statement, what is the nature of
the relation 'corresponds'?

Does the statement correspond

10

with an object of perception or does it correspond
with
an object which has independent existence apart from
thought?

What is the nature of the relation of a statement and fact?
Is fact a conceptual object of existence within
the mind or

is fact an object which has existence without the mind?

To define fact in the following manner,
(3)

x is a fact =df there is a statement,
s, such that x corresponds to s,

does not aid us in our search.

In this definition fact is

defined in terms of its corresponding with a statement

when it was

definition

'a
(2)

statement' which was problematic in the
We either must give up this theory which

provides these definitions or modify the theory in some way.
Semantic Concept

An alternative and modified theory which may give some
insight into the limitations or strengths offered by the

correspondence theory is the "semantic concept of truth".
The worry which the semantic theory addresses is that if
the definition of truth, as presented by the correspondence

theory, is to hold, it necessarily must avoid the problems

entailed by contradiction and antinomies.

The correspondence

theory has suggested that a sentence is true if that

sentence corresponds to a fact, viz. a fact is that

peculiar kind of abstraction which is expressed by
proposition.

a

The semantic conception of truth suggests

11

that the criterion, for the material adequacy
of the

definition of truth, must reflect the equivalence
which
holds between a sentence, which we shall render as
'p',

to

which the word "true" refers, and the name of that
sentence
which is expressed by the sentence

'x is

true'.

Here

I

shall introduce the statement, x is true if, and only
if,
p.

This is called, in Tarski's paper 'The

Semantic

Conception of Truth", "equivalence of the form (T)". 5
do not believe that this creates a problem for

equivalent

(T)

p
•

is

by definition, to some fact f, such that

corresponds to
the form

•

x.)

(l

f

Tarski claims that the equivalence of

serves as a partial definition of truth, i.e.

"it explains wherein the truth of this one individual

sentence consists.
a

The general definition has to be, in

certain sense, a logical conjunction of all of these

partial definitions."^ Thus the equivalence form, sug-

gested by the semantic theory, seems to accord with the

definition of truth offered by the correspondence theory:
a

"A diamond is hard" is true if, and only if,
diamond is hard.

The use of the word "true" here is in keeping with the

semantic use of the term, i.e, it expresses a relation

between a certain expression and the object referred to by
the expression.

However, the criterion of material

adequacy, by which we asserted the equivalence relation

which holds between

a

name of a sentence and the sentence,

12

is clearly not stringent enough to avoid the
unwanted re-

sults of the liar paradox.

If,

example used by Tarski, we take

in appreciation of an
'c'

to be the replacement

of the sentence typed on page 12 of this paper,

line

6

from the top, we may consider the following:
(a)

c

is not a true sentence.

We have been informed of the meaning of

'

c'

so we may

claim
(b)

'c

is not a true sentence'

with

is identical

c.

As suggested by the equivalence of the form
(c)

we have

(T)

'c is not a true sentence' is true, if, and
only if, c is not a true sentence.

The statements expressed by

(b)

and

(c)

yield the contra-

diction
(d)

is true if, and only if,
sentence
c

c is

not a true

This undesirable consequence can be seen to influence

examples presented earlier, e.g. a diamond is hard:
(e)

'A

if,

diamond is hard' is true if, and only
a diamond is hard.

But our notion of "what is true" must embrace all cases
and not just specific cases of our own choosing.

It

might be that we believe we understand the statement,

'a

diamond is hard' is true if, and only if, a diamond is
hard, because of the familiarity we have with the words
used.
(T)

It would seem that if the equivalence of the form

is sufficient,

then we should be able to substitute any

13

sentential variable in place of the expression
is hard' where it occurs.

diamond

'a

But can a natural language be

used to assert the true about itself?

One test might be to

try and quantify into a statement:
(f)

(p)

p

(
*

is true if,

and only if,

p)

But this is of little assistance for though the quantifier

ranges over p in the statement, we do not know what the

value of

'

p
’

is.

Furthermore, when we consider that for

the statement 'a diamond is hard',

only if, a diamond is hard,

'p'

'p'

is true if,

and

may designate anything,

including the sixteenth letter of the alphabet.

We get

little accomplished if we attempt to add other quantifiers
to range over the statement.

The problems we have encoun-

tered are based upon the requirement demanded by the

equivalence of the form
a

(T)

Form

(T)

requires us to have

name of some sentence to take the place of x in the

expression

'x is

true'.

The equivalence of the form

(T)

meets no problem as long as the sentence, which is in-

dicated by the given name of a sentence, is denoted.

When

we attempt to be general rather then specific the formula-

tion fails, e.g.

(f)

above.

The semantic theory, which

is used here to modify the correspondence theory of truth,

results in reflecting the limits of description which a

natural language possesses.

Within the semantic theory

the sentence is restricted to an expression of the natural

language and the problematic terms, such as 'correspondence'

14

and 'fact', are relieved of their burdens, for with
use of
the form

the sentence, and thereby its name, must

(T)

be known

Pragmatic Theory
In brief the remarks so far presented have suggested

that a coherence theory of truth claims the truth of

a

statement can only be asserted if that statement is
consistent to and ascertained by its relations to other
statements whose truth are accepted.

The correspondence

theory of truth claims that the truth of a statement can
be asserted only when the statement claiming a certain fact

refers directly to that fact and in all ways represents that
The last theory of truth to be presented here is

fact.

pragmatic theory of truth.

a

The discussion of a pragmatic

theory of truth will briefly present two formulations:
(

4

)

x is true =df x will prove itself good
to be believed;

and
(

5

)

x is true =df x is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate.®

The first formulation of a pragmatic definition of the
true,

hold.

(

4

)

,

is offered as one with which William James would

The second formulation of the pragmatic definition

of the true is offered by Charles Peirce.

The point of

common beginning which is shared by these two definitions
is the search both philosphers undertook in determining

15

the origin of the term "pragmatism".

The generally accepted notion of pragmatism is that it
is a philosophical trend closely tied to the investigation

of and the recognition of that which is "practical".

William James remarks that the history of the idea shows
that pragmatism is a term derived from the same Greek word
/

meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and
'practical' come.

Peirce, however, who is recognized as

the originator of what has become the modern pragmatic

theory, in a 1905 article,

"What Pragmatism Is", presented

the following account of what he had taken to be pragmatism's

Kantian origin:
Some of his

(Kant’s)

friends wished him to

call it practicism or practicalism

....

But for one who had learned philosophy out of
Kant, as the writer, along with nineteen out of

every twenty experimentalists who have turned to

Philosophy, had done, and who still thought in

Kantian terms most readily, praktisch and

pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles,
the former belonging in a region of thought

where no mind of the experimentalist type can
ever make sure of solid ground under his feet,
the latter expressing relation to some definite

human purpose.

Now quite the most striking

feature of the new theory was its recognition

16

of an inseparable connection between rational

cognition and rational purpose:

and that

consideration it was which determined the
preference for the name pragmatism 10
.

Upon these two historically based descriptions of the

derivation of the term 'pragmatism' rests, in part, the
reason for the two pragmatic theories of truth presented
above.

One other introductory note is of service.

This

concerns the discussion which revolved about Peirce's

statement of the "principle" of pragmatism, alternatively
called the "pragmatic maxim".

This maxim, according to

Peirce, was intended to "furnish a method for the analysis
of concepts.

.

.

.

The method prescribed in the maxim is to

trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical

consequences

-

this is, the consequences for deliberate,

self-controlled conduct

-

of the affirmation or denial of

the concept, and the assertion of the maxim is that herein

lies the whole of the purport of the word, the entire

concept
Pragmatic Maxim
The whole function of thought is to

produce habits of action.

...

To develop

its meaning, we have, therefore, simply
to determine what habit it produces, for

what

a

thing means is simply what habits

17

it involves.

.

.

.

what habit is depends

on when and how it causes us to act.
for the when

,

As

every stimulus to action is

derived from perception; as for the how

,

every purpose of action is to produce some

sensible result.

Thus we come down to

what is tangible and conceivably practical,
as the root of every real distinction of

thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and

there is no distinction of meaning so fine as
to consist in anything but a possible dif-

ference of practice.
I

1
.

7

.

will discuss the impact of this "pragmatic maxim"

upon the work of William James shortly.

But first

I

will

address the definition of truth which is associated with
James.

It would seem that the discussion of James's

pragmatic theory of truth should not harp on how his definition truth relied on subjective and expedient criteria.
That James was aware of the vulnerability of such a position
and would not accept such a position is expressed by him
as follows:

Truth

...

is manifestly incompatible

with waywardness on our part.

Woe to him

whose beliefs play fast and loose with the
order which realities follow in his experiences; they will lead him nowhere or else make

false connections. 13

18

.

.

.

What immediately feels most 'good'

is not always

most 'true' when measured

by the verdict of the rest of experience.14

James's defense of his position, that he recognized the

pragmatism of his description was open to charges which
he had recognized and attempted to avoid, is given support
by Bruce Kuklick.

Kuklick says the claims lodged against

James's subjective element, i.e. a criterion of truth is
the truth an individual believes to be correlated with
fact, are lessened when it is stressed that James claimed

truth not to be defined in respect of an individual but

truth as an "inevitable regulative postulate

-

the for-

ever satisfying for all, the truth proved satisfactory
for all in the long run."

James's notion of the

expedient was not that that which was claimed to be true
was that which seemed most directly to answer to or

correlate to a fact, rather the expedient for James was
that which lead most directly "to an actual merging of

ourselves with the object (of the maximal conceivable
truth in an idea)

,

to an utter mutual confluence and

identification. "16
The basic point which needs to be understood in the

discussion of truth in respect to James is his claim that
there is a correlation between belief and action.
(a

Belief

term within which is also subsumed the notions of idea

and hypothesis)

is an instrument of action,

and its truth
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consists in its verification, i.e. in having the experiences
that the belief predicts we will have,

A true belief is

verified by a truth process of specific involvement.

Herein

it seems as if the truth process allows individual subjec-

tive evaluation.

Upon a closer reading the truth process

is recognized to be a means by which verification and

validation of true belief is asserted when an individual
has not the time nor opportunity to embark personally on
the truth process as concerns each and every belief.

accept my verification of one thing.
We trade on each other's truth.

I

"You

yours of another.

But belief verified

concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole super-

structure."^

A true belief by this description does not

come to be, does not come to exist only upon verification
by somebody.

James claims that the objects of true belief

virtually pre-exist when every condition of their realization is present,

i.e.

every condition except that of

being the experiencer who verifies.
Until established by the end process,
its quality of knowing that
a belief is

(i.e.

to know

"for certain") or indeed of

knowing anything could still be doubted;
and yet the knowing really was there, as
the result now shows.

We were vi rtual

knowers of the (Memorial) Hall long before
we were certified to have been its actual
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knowers, by the precepts retroactive

validating power.
To evaluate these points of explication presented by

James in his own support,

I

shall turn to the formulation

of what is presented by James as a definition of the true:
x is true =df x will prove itself good to

be believe.

Using a statement presented earlier in this paper, then,
the belief held that a diamond is hard is good to be

believed.

That this is so is because this belief is
1)

verified or verifiable in our experience
or in the experience of others;

2)

consistent with our previous beliefs;

3)

answerable to a demand of "elegance" or
"economy" (i.e. it has answered to Ockham's
Razor)

Point

(2)

cation.

stated above needs only a few words of clarifiJames claimed that in the verification of a belief

the truth-process had to be loyal to and mindful of the past

true beliefs held by our ancestors.

(I

will have more to

say about this notion in the later discussion of James and

DuBois.)

The ancestral connection is here claimed by James

because he understood the term "usefulness" in this context

demanded of

a true

to be believed,

belief that in its proving itself good

that belief could not contradict residual

beliefs held in the past.

James makes here the commendable

suggestion that the residual beliefs with which the more
recent verified true beliefs must correlate are those
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beliefs of the past which are themselves true by
verification

.

A question which now can be asked of the "truth-

process" and its allegiance to past true beliefs is this:
Can a true belief of the past be lost forever bv its

being presently verified to be false?"

James would

answer that the true belief of the past can be now verified to be false.

In one respect this "mutability of

truth" presents an alternative to dogmatism which is based

upon a claim of the absoluteness or immutability of truth:
The great assumption of the intellectualists
is that truth means essentially an inert static

relation.

When you've got your true idea of

anything, there's the end of the matter.

You're in possession? you know; you've fulfilled your thinking destiny.

.
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Thus for James a belief is a true belief which proves

itself good to be believed because it allows of itself

constant reflection and, if in our reflection, a retrospective judgment asserts that there is a belief which is
true, despite the judgments of the past thinkers, the

belief verified by our own experience sheds a "backward
light" upon the past.

Whatever are the benefits gained by suggestion of
"mutability of truth", the benefits are short-lived, for
the notion seems to be counterintuitive.

The notion most
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often associated with true belief suggests that the truth
of such a belief is time— independent

,

If

I

am presented

^®r the first time a figure of three sides whose three

interior angles, when added together, total 180 °,
then say,

may

I

"It is now true for me that this figure present

before me is a triangle."

But the temporal reference

marked by the word 'now', does not require that if

I

were the first to have discovered and announced the

properties of triangularity then that truth would have
just come to be true.

Nor would the truth of the figure's

being a triangle be changed if

I

were to correct the

mistaken assertion, offered by others who preceded me,
that that same figure was a square.

The true, as presented

by James, is the sum total of all verified and verifiable

beliefs.

The parting of the pragmatic theories offered by

James and Charles Peirce is marked at this point:

James

suggests that individuals participate in making beliefs
true by specific reference to verified and verifiable

individual experiences? Peirce does not agree.
It would appear that James has interpreted the

"Pragmatic Maxim" to require a definition of the true to

reveal the True's practical and relative effects.

The

relevant protion of the Pragmatic Maxim, which James
took to support his interpretation, reads:
Thus, we come down to what is tangible

and practical as the root of every real
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distinction of thought, no matter
how subtle it may be; and there is
no distinction of meaning so fine as
to consist in anything but a possible

difference of practice.

20

By linking his interpretation of this portion of the
Prag-

matic Maxim to this claim that the term "practical" is derived from classical Greek origins fpfyp* viz

.

practice, the

step to the formulation of a definition reflecting the his-

torical tie between practical and relevant is a short one.
A true belief has associated with it specific actions as

indicated by specific sensible effects
leads to his notion of "good"

,

.

This for James also

for the action associated with

the true belief involves the achievement of specific effects

through the consistency of behaviorial responses, i.e. ex-

perience

:

Truth means nothing but this, that ideas become true
just in so far as they help us to get satisfactory

relation with other parts of our experience 21
.

But the Jamesian definition for the true falls short of

clearly presenting criteria by which the true belief may
be asserted.

The confusion arises by James, on the one

hand, claiming that true beliefs are constructs of

historical development forming "one great stage of

equilibrium in the human mind's development.

...

We

plunge forward into the field of fresh experience with
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the beliefs of our ancestors and we have made already;

these determine what we notice; what we notice determines

what we do; what we do again determines what we experience;
so from one thing to another, still the stubborn fact

remains that there is a sensible flux, what is true of
it seems from the first to last to be largely a matter of

our own creation." 22

On the other hand, the truth

which is a matter of our verification of belief by
experience conflicts without resolution with the true
beliefs which cannot be verified and, so, on Jamesian

ground are not true beliefs, e.g. "All true beliefs are

verified as pragmatism requires."

The truth of this

statement, assuming James's pragmatic criteria, would

demand that the statement be verified.

Yet it seems

impossible to achieve such verification,
I

now turn to an alternative formulation of the

Pragmatic Theory of Truth which is offered by Charles
Peirce.

The definition reads;
x is true =df
x is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate.

Of initial interest is Peirce's distinction of the forum

within which the truth of a true belief is investigated.
The citation of "all who investigate" presented in the

definition is not

a

non-descript group but rather

community composed of scientific researchers.

a

These

scientific researchers seek in their investigations to

eliminate the "ignorance and error which distinguish our
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private selves

(individual self consciousness) from the

absolute ego of pure apperception ." 23

Peirce claims that

that which is true belief does not exist independently of

thought and that true belief is not dependent upon what
or how we think.

Rather a true belief is independent of

all that is arbitrary and individual in thought.

As a

result the intellectual construct which is the result of

information and thought is a definite form, the true, which
would be arrived at by any other mind under sufficiently
favorable conditions.

"Different minds may set out with

the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investi-

gation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one
and the same conclusion.

This activity of thought by which

we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained
goal, is like the operation of destiny." 2 ^

The truth, as

discussed by James, had borne the suggestion of its being
mutable; the truth for Peirce is that which is universal.
For Peirce true, which is itself an intellectual construct,
is immutable, viz.

flows,"

the "unmoving form to which human thought

The real and the true for Peirce are the last

products of human action and were simultaneous in their

realization
The truth is the opinion which is fated
to be ultimately agreed to by all who

investigate
and
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The real

.

.

.

is that which,

sooner or

later, information and reasoning would

finally result in

...
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The distinction between the Jamesian and Peircean

theories of truth can be now highlighted.

James claimed

that the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property

inherent in it.

"Truth happens to an idea.

It becomes

O£

true, is made true by events."

To the contrary Peirce

claims that the truth of an idea is the intellectual

construct which encourages us to regard sense appearance
as signs of what is ultimately real

.

What is ultimately

real demands that there be a regularity which would account
for the differing relations of the real.

The regularity

of the general behavior evidenced under all conceivable

circumstances is the meaning of an intellectual concept.
The Pragmatic Maxim, as interpreted by James, suggested

that individual sensations determine what an intellectual

concept/construct is.

Thus the truth of

a

belief is

determined by the sensations expected from it and the
reactions prepared directed towards it.

The Pragmatic

Maxim as intended by Peirce leads to analysis of that
which is the mode of being of an object as an intellectual
concept/construct, i.e, a universal.

Against James, Peirce

charges, "The sedulous exclusion from the method prescribed
in the maxim of all reference to sensation is specially
to be remarked ."
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The statement, "A diamond is hard" is
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true belief when the subject of predication
would behave in
a

certain general way, that is, "it would be true under

given experiential circumstances, taken as they would
occur
ex P er ience

•

Thus the true belief is a belief which is

"

caused by the real.
is hard",

The truth of the belief, that "A diamond

can be claimed when a final opinion, the result

of application of scientific method to belief, is obtained.

That "a diamond is hard" is to claim
that in an experimental situation if
the hardness was applicable to the

subject 'diamond', then the operation
of presenting a scratch test upon the

diamond would produce the result that
the diamond would not be scratched.

The description of the experimental situation just presented,

joined to the Peircean definition of truth raises questions

about the adequacy of claims against the Peircean theory.
One may as Peirce,

"What gives the scientific method the

certainty upon which the quest for truth, in your system is
based?
In asmwering this question Peirce perhaps would argue

the following.

The term 'fated', as used within the

definition of the true, is not to be confounded with
suggestion of mysticism.

a

That which is 'fated' in this

respect is that which, if scientifically investigated, is
bound to happen and cannot be avoided.

Scientific
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investigation demands situations of confirmation and testing.
Each situation of confirmation and testing must be done

with clearly stated boundaries which insure that all the

recordable habits which are associated with an intellectual
concept are recorded.

This is required to avoid the un-

desirable results of, for example, testing mercury and
finding that it too fails the "scratch test".

Without the

boundaries specified within scientific investigation then,
like a diamond is hard, i.e. would not be scratched, so
too would mercury be hard.

However, in spite of such stated

boundaries, those who investigate do not come to know with

certainty that a given belief is true.

Rather it is the

recognition of the role of human error that leads Peirce to
introduce the doctrine of "fallibilism.

"

Fallibilism, if

correctly incorporated within scientific investigation, will

move human opinion closer to a closer approximation of the
truth only.

Fallibilism requires

a

"confession of inaccuracy

and one-sidedness" be incorporated within a belief statement.
"This is an essential ingredient of truth."

Truth is that concordance of an abstract
statement with the ideal limit towards

which endless investigation would tend
to bring scientific belief, which con-

cordance the abstract statement may possess
by virtue of the confession of its inac-

curacy and one-sidedness, and this
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confession is an essential ingredient
of truth.
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Fallibilism offers scientific investigation, i.e. the
organized pursuit after truth, parameters within which
belief statements can be measured to move closer to that

which is fated to be believe. Fallibilism also requires a
confession of the inaccuracies or one-sidedness associated
with results of testing.

By so stating the inaccuracies

of investigation the end state of the infalliable is never

confused with that which is ultimately moving towards that
end.
a

Just how the confession is to be incorporated within

given statement of belief is not clearly presented, but

perhaps it might be done as follows:
The statement, "A diamond is hard",

I

have found to be true when a diamond is

tested for "scratchability " under all

conditions of temperature and pressure

which our laboratory skills have made
available to us.
The benefit of the belief qualified by the confessional is

that in the experimental situation within which the inac-

curacies are lessen progressively, so too does the degree
to which the belief accords with truth increase.

Thus

this process brings the investigator toward the real, the

intellectual construct, fated to be the end of investigation.
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The consideration of these remarks does not settle
the

question of how certainty in this method of scientific
investigation can be claimed beyond other methods.

If

there are endless investigations which can be looked for-

ward to in one course of inquiry, such as scientific
investigation, can it be that there are as many possible

courses of inquiry available to us as there are number of

investigations within one possible course?

Do all such

courses need to be engaged in to be carried to that which
we are fated to believe?

Do all such courses of investi-

gation, and the ends reached through an infinite number of
steps available to each, converge at the same fated belief;
the same fated conceptual reality?

Had Peirce offered his definition of "the true

'

1

as

itself true, the questions just listed would raise important
doubts.

In the face of such questions the Peircean could

perhaps answer by saying that

’x

is true belief if,

and

only if, x is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who

investigate

1

is not claimed to be a true belief; nor does

the Peircean claim that upon endless investigation by all

who are so engaged will arrive at and agree to it.

Rather

'x is

fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who investi-

gate’

is a description of the kind of conditions to which

that concept of truth applies.
I

do not say that it is infallibly

true that there is any belief to which
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a person would come if he were to carry

his inquires far enough.

that that alone is what
I

I

I

only say

call truth,

cannot infallibly know that there is

any truth 30
.

CHAPTER

II

DUBOIS AND HARVARD'S GOLDEN AGE
(The discussion presented in Chapter I suggests that,
from the time of the earliest philosophical discussions to
the present dialogue, discussion concerning theories of
truth make-up a large and rich body of literature within
philosophy.
I shall now consider a theory of truth as
developed within the writings of William Edward Burghardt
DuBois
.

DuBois and Truth

An explicit philosophic discussion of DuBois' theory
of truth was not detailed in any one of DuBois' works

.

Rather

his theory was developed by necessity within related areas
of academic inquiry,

less DuBois'

i.e.

sociology and history.

Nonethe-

theory of truth was firmly based in early and

intensive study of philosophy in Harvard University 18881892,

These are the years during which 'pragmatism' was

an important subject of dialogue between two of pragmatism's

early

f ormulators

,

Charles Peirce and William James.

We

should also note that the association between DuBois and
James, begun at Harvard, was to last, with personal meetings
and an exchange of correspondence, until James's death in
1910.

The period of DuBois and James's most intimate con-

tact,

1888-1892, is the midway point of what Bruce Kuklick,

in The Rise of American Philosophy

at Harvard".

,

calls the "Golden Age

Thus, because of this Harvard connection, and

the close personal association between DuBois and James,
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this subject of DuBois

small interest.

theory of truth promises to be of no

'

DuBois

1

ideas about truth may have impor-

tance beyond their being his personally formulated
concepts.
It is possible that in addition to Peircean pragmatism
and

Jamesian pragmatism, another pragmatic theory was developed
and nurtured within the same environment, at the same time,
and bearing fruit from mutual dialogue.

This would include

DuBois' pragmatic theory of truth.
We have evidence of DuBois' long term interest and

work which address the notion of truth.
1956,

In a January 10,

letter written by the then eighty-seven year old

DuBois to his literary executor, Herbert Aptheker
states
.

.

.

it was in search of answers to

the fundamental problems which you
(Aptheker) discuss that

Harvard

....

I

I

went to

determined to go

to the best university in the land

and if possible in the world, to

discover Truth, which
a

I

spelled with

capital.
For two years

I

studied under

William James while he was developing
Pragmatism- under George Santayana and
his attractive mysticism and under

Josiah Royce and his Hegelian idealism,

,

DuBois
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I

then found and adopted a philosophy

which has served me since.

.

.

.

Several

times in the past

I

ulate it (DuBois

philosophy) but met

'

have started to form-

such puzzled looks that it remains only

partially set down in scraps of manuscript.
I

gave up the search of "Absolute" Truth;

not from doubt of the existence of reality,

but because

I

believe that our limited

knowledge and clumsy methods of research
made it impossible now completely to

apprehend Truth.

I

nevertheless firmly

believed that gradually the human mind and
absolute and provable truth would approach
each other nearer and nearer and yet never
in all eternity meet.
to Assumption

-

I

therefore turned

scientific Hypothesis.

I

assumed the existence of Truth since to
assume anything else or not to assume was
unthinkable.

I

assumed that Truth was only

partially known but that it was ultimately
largely knowable, although perhaps in part
forever Unknowable.

Science adopted the

hypothesis of a knower and something known.
The Jamesian Pragmatism as

I

understood it

from his lips was not based on the "usefulness"
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of a hypothesis but on its workable

logic if its truth was assumed,'*'

This letter raises two questions:

What material within

DuBois' papers gives support to the claim that he began to

formulate and note his "adopted" philosophy?

What supports

his claim that Jamesian Pragmatism was based "on its work-

able logic" if the truth of a hypothesis was assumed?

To

begin formulating an answer to these questions, we may turn
to DuBois

course.

1

1389 thesis written for James’s Philosophy IV

The work entitled, "The Renaissance of Ethics:

A Critical Comparison of Scholastic and Modern Ethics,"
DuBois' senior thesis, "The Renaissance of Ethics",
is given some attention in The Art and Imagination of W.E.B,

DuBois by Arnold Rampersad.

Preliminarily to this discus-

sion Rampersad offers an insightful discussion of DuBois'

Specifically Rampersad in some detail

Harvard experience.

outlines the generation of DuBois' philosophic exposure
(in thought and personality) while at Harvard,

Of the

thesis prepared by DuBois for James, in Philosophy IV,

Rampersad states;
"The Renaissance of Ethics" is by

no means a mature work,

.

.

,

certain

passages show an unsure grasp of his
material.

.

.

.

These passages do not

invalidate the general honesty or
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seriousness of DuBois

'

paper.

Its

thesis revealed his current approach
to that aspect of philosophy which most

interested him:

efficacious duty.

.

.

The basic determination for the individual
is the exploration of the difference bet-

ween the best possible world and the worst
possible world.

Thus, DuBois argued,

the debate over ethics was teleological
in nature.

The question of duty depended

on the resolution of the cause and purpose
of life, an identification James applauded.

DuBois had replaced the notion of the

Summum bonum

,

identical with God in

scholasticism, with the notion of a

relativistic prime force whose existence
was arrived at by an empirical process
that avoided transcendental categories.

DuBois moved toward the distinction that,
"What was needed was recognition of a

clear distinction between science and
The mixture of science, meta-

ethics.

physics, and ethics needed to be dissolved
into twin streams of science and tele-

The former would lead to what

ology,

DuBois called Truth, the latter to ethical
theory

o
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It is appropriate at this point to address the claim

that Rampersad uses to introduce this discussion, i.e.

that "The Renaissance of Ethics" is by no means a mature
work.

It is true that "certain passages show an unsure

grasp of his material", if we take the marginal notes

written in James's hand to be accurate in their points of
criticism.

But it may also be accurate to claim that those

areas of academic discussion highlighted by James are not
the sole areas with which DuBois was most interested.

For

on pages 26-27 of the thesis we find this exchange between

DuBois and James,
"Act" says Martineau and his

DuBois:

school "in accordance with the highest

motive," which is but a subjective state-

ment of the scholastic "Seek the Highest
Good," a rule which, to anyone having

faith in certain teleology, is as ultimate
as possible.

Lately however, with

Professors James and Royce, a variation
of this comes in:

another attempt to

base ethics upon fact

science

.

-

to make it a

This theory may be so stated:

the attempt to unify goods and find a

summum bonum is fruitless and impossible:
there is therefore no summum bonum and
one must strive to realize all that
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anyone anywhere calls Good.
James adds a note which is directed
by drawn line to DuBois

'

phrase, "to make

it a science", which reads:

"I doubt

whether we do seek to make it

a

science

-

to me that seems impossible."

The exchange noted in the passage above raises an

issue concerning the maturity of the work.

The teacher/

pupil relationship, which has been a subject of great

interest within philosophy, holds a place of importance
here.

This relationship is especially important when the

student wishes to protect the teacher from what the student
suspects is a weakness in an argument or a claim made by
the teacher which the student considers vulnerable.

Can

we find within DuBois' remarks, hints that he hoped to

modify James's position so that criticism, which undoubtedly

would surface, might either be deflected or prepared for?
I

believe we can find such hints within this thesis.

begin we might turn to DuBois

'

To

claim that science would

bring fresh perspective to an "understanding of truth".
This suggests a marked departure from James's belief that:
ideas become true in so far as they help
us to

get into satisfactory relation with

other parts of our experience, to summarize
them and get about them by conceptual shortcuts

.

.

.

any idea that will carry us
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prosperously from any one part of our
experience to any other part, linking
things satisfactorily, working securely,

simplifying, saving labor; is true for
just so much, true in so far forth,
true instrumentally

...

So some new

idea mediates between the ancient stock
of old opinions and the new experience

and runs them into one another most

felicitously and expediently

.

.

.

This

new idea is then adopted as the true one.
It marries old opinion to new fact so as

ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum
of continuity,

The DuBois and James Separation

DuBois’ claim that "science would bring fresh per-

spectives to an understanding of eternal truth" was developed within the climate of Harvard University,

James was

the Harvard professor who had the greatest influence upon
DuBois, and those years, in which he was involved with James,

were clearly years of great intellectual activity for James,

James’s activities included intensive work and thought in
both psychology and philosophy.

It should be remembered

that in the late nineteenth century the studies of psych-

ology and philosophy, though separate, were not unfamiliar
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to one another and in some instances shared
the same class-

room.

For example, the question of 'the will', and how it

was central in the disputes of the determinists and
indeter-

minists was central to the psychologist as well as the

philosopher

.

The discussion between these camps greatly

involved James.

However, by the time DuBois joined the

Harvard student body and then enrolled in James's Philosophy
IV,

James clearly was in the midst of this philosophical

speculation.

The interplay between these academic areas of

interest, i.e. psychology and philosophy, can be seen in
James' efforts to resolve a conflict between the deterministic

assumptions of the science of his day and the indeterministic
assumptions of ethics.

James wanted the rigors of the

scientific discipline to aid in his search for Truth, but
he needed the assurance that he sought after science of his

own free will.

James sought to assure himself that he was

the agent of his own decision making.

His attempts to arrive

at a resolution of these conflicting notions led to the

development of Jamesian Pragmatism,

These attempts at

resolution were to generate the split between the prag-

matism as presented by James and the pragmatism as offered
by Charles Peirce,

The attention that James gave to the 'will' and its

position in the justification of indeterminism is directly
connected to DuBois
lowing manner.

’

developing ideas of truth in the fol-

In sympathy with James' efforts to suggest
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an alternative to the associationists

position of deter-

'

minism, i.e. a mechanistic explanation of and reduction
of

consciousness to brain activity, DuBois stressed that the
will should not be correlated to "nervous discharge accom-

panying the feeling of effort to do something."

To suggest

this connection would be to suggest that the will had a

physiological origin.
internal origin.

The will for James must have an

This insured its uniqueness and demanded

selectivity among the alternatives presented in light of
human needs and interests.
by the mind.

The mind was then made an active element in

decision making, not
automata.

This selection was accomplished

a

central dispatcher for a conscious

But the mind in James's plan offered even greater

service to the human than mere selection from among the

many stimuli presented to it.
a

The mind allowed man to be

conscious knower
The knower is an actor, and co-efficient
of the truth on one side, whilst on the

other he registers the truth which he
helps to create.

Mental interests,

hypotheses, postulates, so far as they
are bases for human action

-

action

which to a great extent transforms the

world

-

help to make the truth which

they declare.

In other words there

belongs to mind, from its birth
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upward, a spontaneity, a vote.

It is in

the game, and not a mere looker-on.^

The suggestion here is that there does not exist a world of

truth independent of our own knowledge.

If there were,

then

the mind would be passive in the presence of that body of

knowledge.

Contrary to this passivity James argued that

because the mind, the will, was free it helped to create

part of the world it came to know.
matic view now comes through.

The hint of the prag-

The idea that the mind is a

partner in the generation of truth leads us to James

'

argu-

ment, as presented by Morton White in The Age of Analysis:

The true is that which we ought to believe;

That which we ought to believe is what is

best for us to believe; Therefore, the true
is that which is best for us to believe.

There have been many objections voiced to this argument as

developed by James.

Of note for this part of our discussion

are the objections to the second premise, which demand for

example, that James make clear response to the question,
,;

Good for whom?"

DuBois objected to the question "Good for

whom?" being answered by the response, "For the individual!"
In "The Renaissance of Ethics" written in 1889, we find

DuBois making a clear distinction between choices made by the

individual based upon his desires to be true of an opinion
and choices made by an individual based upon his desire to

seek the Truth.

The Truth for DuBois was that which was
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unchanging, and the advancement of man was the
measure of
the progress he made toward becoming more
knowledgeable

of

Truth
What then is the step needed to complete
the renaissance of ethics and differentiate

modern from scholastic ethics?
it,

It is,

I

take

that thought be separated as follows:

SCIENCE to answer WHAT?

—

TELEOLOGY to answer WHY?

TRUTH

—» ETHICS

Man seeks answers to these two questions:

What is this?

Why is it such as it is?

There are two methods he may pursue:

he

may guess at why it is, or he may system-

atically and carefully find out what it is
in order that facts may guide his guesses

and ultimately lead him to the Truth.

Manifestly if his work is any ways intricate,
and if it is of any moment whether he arrives
at the Truth or not, he should take the latter

method:

true it may never lead him to the

Truth, but it will lead him nearer than any

other path.

7

The discussion which DuBois directs to this subject,
of the methodology of the search for Truth, comprises fully
the last quarter of the discussion in the "Renaissance of

Ethics".

All processes are sharply criticized which employ
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answers to the "WHY?" without first becoming
involved or
benefitting from a systematic search for Truth which
is

the mark of science in its answering the "WHAT?".

The World has partially come to the con-

clusion, that it must fully come to the

conclusion that the only way to find why
the world is, is to find what it is - the

only path to teleology is science.
I

suggest that DuBois' assertion, "The only path to

teleology is science," and later, "The object then of
science is Truth; Truth is the one path to teleology, tele-

ology is ethics," are points of criticism directed against
the philosophical position of his intellectual mentor.

For

James truth is additive and modifiable, i.e. we add to the

beliefs held by our ancestors.

Suppose one is confronted

with data that cannot be reconciled with opinions one now
holds.

According to James one is to find

a new truth

through the pragmatic exercise of determining which is

important in one's own life.

James expresses his view

aphoristically in these words:
'The true'

is only the expedient in our

way of thinking, just as 'the right' is
the only expedient in the way of our

behavior

9

DuBois claims, to the contrary, that the individual has

responsibility to seek 'the true', which is important in
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one’s own life, only as it will benefit men, not just
what
an individual determines to be important to himself.

in

"The Renaissance of Ethics" DuBois states that it is
the duty of each individual to choose

between the two possible worlds:
the best possible, b)

a)

the worst pos-

sible, when the difference between the
two is not based upon the like or dis-

like but rather upon the individual to

select the universe which is Right or
the universe which is Wrong.

The Right

and the Wrong are separated by the process of answering "What is each?"^

These demands are satisfied for DuBois by making science,
i.e.

a

systematic search, a requirement for seeking ’the

true’.

Thus there in fact may be

a

"jolt" to the thinking

and understanding of the individual which James sought to
avoid.

The argument presented by DuBois is consistent

with his experiences of the past and the designs which,
even then, he was in the process of constructing for his
future work.
DuBois' rejection of James's pragmatic view is high-

lighted in the text of the Commencement Address given by
DuBois in 1890 when he received his Bachelor's Degree from
Harvard.

The address was titled, "Jefferson Davis as a

Representative of Civilization",

In it DuBois described
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Jefferson Davis in this way:
However Jefferson Davis may appear as
a man,

as race,

or a nation, his life

can only logically mean this:

the

advance of a part of the world at the

expense of the whole; the overwhelming
sense of the

I,

and the consequent for-

getting of the Thou. 11
Davis did not attempt to make the best possible world.

According to DuBois, Davis did not do so because he made
decisions based upon dogma, rather than upon evidence

empirically gather through

a science.

In James's words,

the true for Davis had become the expedient way of thinking

and the right had become the expedient in the way of be-

havior, however, the result had little good, if any, for
all concerned.
In The Commencement Address of 1890, as in his "Ren-

aissance" thesis of 1889, we see that Duty for DuBois is
to be guarded by actions which answer to the Truth as

honestly determined through systematic investigation which
considers as many alternatives as is possible.

Thus the

involvement of Jefferson Davis "in the crowning absurdity,
became the peculiar champion of a people fighting to be
free in order that another people should not be free,"

Given James's view that the true is the expedient in our
way of thinking, then Jefferson Davis can be viewed as

a
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pragmatist and it is such pragmatism which DuBois attacks.
So far

I

have mentioned that according to James' prag-

matic theory, truth is what is "Immediately satisfying to
some individual", i.e. that which gives one the maximum

possible sum of satisfactions, but consistency with previous truth and with novel fact".

What is true for an

individual is certainly important, but James argues that
more important are
our fundamental ways of thinking about things

which are discoveries of exceedingly remote
ancestors, which have been able to preserve

themselves throughout the experience of all

subsequent time

...

We plunge forward into

the field of fresh experience with beliefs

of our ancestors; these determine what we

notice; what we notice determines what we
do; what we do again determines what we

experience; so from one thing to another,

altho the stubborn fact remains that there is

sensible flux, what is true of it seems from
the first to the last to be largely a

matter of our own creation

.

The text from which the above is cited was first pub-

lished in 1907, twenty years after James' first meeting

with DuBois.

About ten years earlier, 1898, James pre-

sented an address entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and
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Pra£i ca l Results" which gave first voice to what
he called
the principle of practicalism or pragmatism.

This address

presented ideas with which James had been in contact
since
Peirce had presented related thoughts in 1878

(actually

Peirce had earlier presented the principle of pragmatism

before the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge in 1872).

period of the DuBois/James encounter was thus

a

The

formative

period in the development James’s pragmatic thought and
of positions he later explained in lectures and books. The

passage from James quoted above concerns the debt we pay
to our ancestors in what we hold to be true.

I

suggest

that we can uncover another area of concern for DuBois,

which sparks the repetition of DuBois' call made within
"The Renaissance of Ethics" i.e. a systematic approach in
the search for Truth.

A systematic approach would avoid

the problems generated by the first person pronouns used

by James, e.g.

"our fundamental ways of thinking",

"our

remote ancestors", "we determine", "our nouns and adjectives", etc., which did not include DuBois, the descendent
of Africans.

The history of Africa, viz. the cultures and

socities which flourished, the art, the social structures
/\

and systems, trade, language, philosophy, etc., was denied,
by the historical researchers, to have ever had any signi-

ficance or importance.

In the late 19th century this at-

titude was used as one point of justification for the

expansion into and colonization of Africa.
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Before coining to Harvard DuBois had spent three years
(1885-1888)

earning a Bachelor's Degree from Fisk University.

Fisk was then

a

Nashville, Tenn.

school with an all-Black student body, in
.

During the summers there DuBois worked

in the hamlets of the countryside tutoring and giving

instruction to the Black children now newly born into freedom.

The adults within these hamlets had some twenty years

before also been newly born into freedom.

The lessons

which DuBois taught were not to match the lessons he learned.
He learned to appreciate the intellectual hunger present in

his young charges, a hunger which he could not satisfy

during a summer's meeting and a hunger which had not magically appeared after the emancipation.

But more important

was the resolve DuBois developed to investigate scienfi-

cally the facts which lead to the bondage that, by law and
social convention, kept a freed people in a new slavery,
i.e.

the color caste system.

The pain of this continued

oppression was exacerbated because DuBois realized that the
history of this oppressed people had content which was
denied importance.

If the

'truth', of James's under-

standing, was based upon the discoveries of exceedingly

remote ancestors, then DuBois' ancestors of Africa must too
be included; however, he found no such record nor reference.
If the truth is realized in stages and the beliefs of our

ancestors determine what we notice, what we do, what we
experience, then that truth is untruthful when it denies
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part of that by which it is determined.

systematic search for truth based upon

In demanding a
a

science unbiased

by dogma or scholastic teleological faith, DuBois can be

seen calling into question the credibility of the Jamesian

pragmatic theory’s understanding of truth, and its suggested
answer to the question 'what is the true?"

CHAPTER
DUBOIS:

III

HIS OWN PHILOSOPHY

(Though I suggest in Chapter II that DuBois was not as
closely associated with Jamesian pragmatism as generally
thought, I present in this Chapter some worries which suggest that DuBois would not have been at ease embracing
Peircean pragmatism. A subtle point which lies in the
background, but has some importance on the Chapter's point
of view, is the suggestion that within Peirce's work is
exampled mid-nineteenth century thought which had not yet
come to grips with the complexities engendered by racism:
the problem of the twentieth century.)

The DuBois and Peirce Separation

Bruce Kuklick, in his discussion, "Charles Sanders
Peirce"

,

in The Rise of American Philosophy , suggests that

Peirce's revised theory of knowledge was based on the
"primacy of subject-predicate logic."

Though it is unlikely

that DuBois and Peirce discussed Peirce's pragmatic philosophy, DuBois seems to have either encountered or anticipated

Peirce's theory.

Within "Of the Dawn of Freedom", the

second essay in The Souls of Black Folk

,

DuBois presents a

study of the 'period of history from 1861 to 1872 so far as
it relates to the American Negro."

In this essay DuBois

stressed the efforts of the Negro people to defeat the South,
as well as Negro people who gave themselves to the defense of

that social institution, slavery, which was predicated upon

their being members of an inferior race.

In this essay

DuBois details the programs leading to and comprising the
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Freedman's Bureau.

The hopes and successes of Blacks were

noted, in addition to a developed intellectual climate which

undermined hopes, plans, achievements of Black people.

A

reflection of that theoretical framework, upon which hung
the principles of the nation, which undercut the Blacks’

aspirations to realize full and equal participation within

American society, can be found in Peirce's theory of knowledge.

Peirce was developing his theory of the "logic of

relations" during the 1860

's;

this is the period during which

DuBois discussed in his essay "Of the Dawn of Freedom".

Kuklick represents Peirce's theory of knowledge as follows:
(

1

)

"If relations were as abstract and as funda-

mental as the qualities of subject-predicate
logic, the meaning of our concept of an ob-

ject might be in its relations to other objects or in the relations among its states
at various times.

„1

This may be read to imply, when considering the Negro

problem:
(

1 ')

The Negro is related to all things as

I

,

a

white man, am related, or the Negro is a man
v/ho

has at various times relations different,

than mine, among his states.

Which disjunct of

(

1

)

would be considered persuasive by a

nineteenth century white intellectual.
the second disjunct; he continues

Peirce argued for
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(2)

the relations in which a thing stood

.

to other things might determine its "essen-

tial nature"

(quality)

rather than this

nature determining its relations to other
things

.

"

This may be read to imply, when considering the Negro

problem;
(2')

The manner in which a Negro is, in regards
j

to all those things about him, e.g. culture,

education, skills, intelligence, etc., may

readily reflect his "essential nature" rather
than the Negro being considered a man deter-

mining his position as

I.

And, if one were to have asked in 1863 of a white Bostonian

intellectual, such as Peirce, "How do you explain the apparent

differences between the white and black races?", he might
have answered
(3)

.

.

the meaning of our conception of an

object might depend on the law governing its
relations to other objects and not on the

quality it embodied."

3

This may be read to imply, when considering the Negro
problem;
(3‘

The Negro is a man who stands in a different

relation to other things when compared to
white, and it is not a shared quality of

a

54

"manhood" that he embodies.

Peirce may have never had occasion to discuss the

Negro problem, though such

a

discussion of the Civil War

would have been difficult for a twenty-two year-old male
to avoid.

However, we do find hint of such a concern within

the following:

though the question of realism and nominalism
has its roots in the technicalities of logic,
its branches reach about our life.

The

question whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals, is the

question whether there is anything of any
more dignity, worth, and importance than
individual happiness, individual aspiration,
and individual life.

Whether men really

have anything in common, so that the com-

munity is to be considered as an end in
itself, and if so, what the relative value of
the two factors is, is the most fundamental

practical question in regard to every public
institution the constitution of which we have
it in our power to influence.

4

It seems evident to me that the first two lines of the

above announce Peirce's recognition that the language which
is used in logic, by which properties are ascribed of ob-

jects, and, which is expressed by a formal theory of sets.
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also "reaches about our life".

about our life"?

what does he mean by "reaches

Given Peirce's theory of meaning he had to

include, in any perception of an object of experience which
had meaning, knowing the habits it involves.

What is the

habit involved with the branches of the technicalities of
logic reaching about our life?

statements which are true.

The habit is asserting

It seems that Peirce's pragmatism

asserted that the same way questions of philosophy are ad-

dressed and answered so too could the questions which are
asked by societies of men be addressed and answered:

"The

question whether the genus homo has any existence except
as individuals is the most fundamental practical question

in regard to every public institution the constitution of
5
which we have it in our power to influence ."

power spoken of here?

What is the

Who are the 'we' for whom he speaks?

What is the constitution which will be influenced and how
will that influence be exerted?

Quickly said the "power"

and the "influence" seem to be correction of faulty use
of words which state many things which are not true; the

constitution is an abstract thing which collectively

make')

up the laws which rule the organization's functionings.

However, if Peirce's theory of meaning, not extended beyond
the questions which address it as a philosophy, is met by

worries to which satisfactory reply

cannot be given, then

the power and influence that philosophy might have upon the

constitutions of every public institution is questioned.
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The Collapse and Rise of a Pragmatic Theory

Peirce’s theory collapsed at two points.
case asserted that to know

a

Peirce in one

thing’s meaning was simply to

determine what habits (modes of action) it engendered.
^

thing means is simply habits it involves,"^

"What

Objects were

then no more than all their conceivable "effects ".

7

While

holding this position Peirce also argued that there was an

independently existing object which caused the phenomena of
"effects".

To accommodate this notion of phenomena Kuklick

reports Peirce asserted "the real was both

a

permanent and

inexhaustable possibility of sensation and wholly cognized.
He rendered this notion consistent by postulating an infi-

nite future that realized those possibilities of sensation." 8
One problem which such a notion could not convincingly re-

spond to was that if inquiry were to be carried on infi-

nitely then inquiry would be incognizable.

This notion also

seemed to contradict Peirce's earlier work which claimed,
in agreement with Kant, that metaphysical realism was an

"instantly fatal" idea, i.e. the idea of a thing in itself

conceived as

a

thing existing independent of mind:

The essence of

(Kant and Peirce's)

9

philos-

ophy was to regard the real object as deter-

mined by the mind.
was regarded as

a

...

In short reality

normal product of mental
.

.

action, and not as the incognizable cause of it.

10
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Unlike Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning, James’s

pragmatic theory of truth became untenable when, within
James

s

scheme, truth became dependent upon the experiences

had by individuals.

This could not guarantee universality.

Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning collasped with Peirce's

attempt to construct meanings upon beliefs held of an object.
An object of thought, because of the infinitude of inquiry

being incognizable, was claimed to be incognizable.
more, Peirce’s "belief" demanded ’modes of action',
'effects' of and upon thought.

Further'habit',

The theory of meaning was

lost when the objects which have meaning, i.e. objects of
thought, became objects independent of thought

realism is instantly fatal.

matic theory of meaning.

-

metaphysical

DuBois offered another prag-

His statement of that pragmatic

theory of meaning is continuously used as the cornerstone
of his pragmatic theory of truth.

It was

for which

’truth'

He claimed that a correct theory of meaning

DuBois strove.

postulated that we, as thinking beings, moved toward the
absolute. Truth, only by pursuits of intellect.
ing is from DuBois'

The follow-

1908 lecture presented at Fisk Univer-

sity on the occasion of DuBois' twentieth reunion visit.
The lecture is titled "Galileo Galilei".
.

.

.

Judge this World Genuis not simply

by the things he learned, but rather by
the ignorance of his Age.

day when

This was a

falling and gravitation were
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things too slight for human minds to

ponder over; when time depended on sundials and hourglasses; and when the

grand old legend of Joshua and the sun
in Analon was regarded as a plain and

literal statement of fact. It was

a

day when men assumed knowledge of the

whole Truth and argued down to individual fact, instead of ceaselessly, end-

lessly, and minutely studying the fact

and then guessing as we do today cautiously
at the mighty shadow of Reality

DuBois'

.

theory entailed studying fact and then trying

scientifically to extrapolate Truth.
ing to DuBois approach Truth?

How does one, accord-

Initially, the meanings of

words which have been accepted and are in common use within
must be examined to seek discrepancies and correct

a language

such if found.
.

,

.

There was never a time in the history

of America when the system (slave trade and

the institution of slavery) had a slighter

economic, political, and moral justification
than in 1787; and yet, with this real, existent, growing evil before their eyes, a

bargain largely of dollars and cents was
allowed to open the highway that led
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straight to the Civil War.

.

.

With the faith of the nation broken
at the very outset, the system of slavery

untouched, and twenty years' respite given
to the slave trade to feed and foster it,

there began, with 1787, that system of

bargaining, truckling, and compromising

with a moral, political, and economic

monstrosity which makes the history of
our dealing with slavery in the first

half of the nineteenth century so dis-

creditable to a great people.

.

.

,

One

cannot, to be sure, demand of whole

nations exceptional moral foresight and
heroism, but a certain hard common sense
in facing the complicated phenomena of

political life must be expected in every

progressive people.

In some respects we

as a nation seem to lack this; we have

the somewhat inchoate idea that we are

not destined to be harassed with the

great social questions, and that even if
we are, and fail to answer them, the fault
is with the question and not with us.

Con-

sequently we often congratulate ourselves
more on getting rid of a problem than on
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solving it.

Such an attitude is

dangerous; we have and shall have, as
other peoples have had, critical, momentus,
A
and pressing questions to answer.

.

.

.

It behooves the United States, therefore, in the interest both of scientific

truth and of future social reform, carefully to study such chapters of her history
as that of the suppression of the slave

trade.

The most obvious question which

this study suggests is: How far in a state

can a recognized moral wrong safely be

compromised? 12
DuBois designed to solve a problem, the problem of the

color-line, i.e. racism.

Before that problem could be ad-

dressed the meanings of the words and concepts had to be
first established; for there was no understanding between
the races.

That this problem was long standing was reported

DuBois
The colonists averred with perfect truth
that they did not commerce this fatal

traffic, but that it was imposed upon them

from without.

Nevertheless, all too soon

did they lay aside scruples against it and

hasten to share its material benefits.

Even

those who braved the rough Atlantic for the
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highest moral motives fell early victims
to the allurements of this system.

Thus,

throughout colonial history, in spite of
many honest attempts to stop the further

pursuit of the slave trade, we notice back
of nearly all such attempts a certain

moral apathy, an indisposition to attack
the evil with the sharp weapons which its

nature demanded.

Consequently, there

developed steadily, irresistibly,

a

vast

social problem which required two centuries
and a half for a nation of trained European

stock and boasted moral fibre to solve. 13

How and where were efforts being made to encourage and es-

tablish moral standards of a nation in the middle of the
19th century?

Massachusetts.

Most notably at centers such as Cambridge,
In January 1860,

a

committee of the

Harvard Board of Overseers stated, in a committee report
"Intellectual and Moral Philosophy", that training in

philosophy was "brief and hurried," "an exercise of memory
more than understanding."

’’The

effect of this curtailing

and abandonment of the most important studies in the course
of a liberal education was evident and

.

.

.

14
well known."

Without proper drill in moral philosophy. Harvard graduates,
it was feared, might succumb to attacks on "the fundamental

principles of religion and ethics, and without proper drill
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in intellectual philosophy they would never
attain the

mental development and self-discipline necessary
for
successful work in the world.
^ ar vard

^

Early members of the

Department of Philosophy were
Francis Bowen born 1811;

Chauncey Wright born 1830;
John Fiske born 1842;

Francis Ellingwood Abbot born 1836;

Charles Sanders Peirce born 1839;

William James born 1842;*
George Herbert Palmer born 1842;* and

Josiah Royce born 1855.

*

All of these listed above had lived through the Civil War
period.

(George Santayana is not included for he was born

and raised in Spain.)

The point is that DuBois brought a

unique genius to Cambridge in 1888.

It was a genius which

grasped the "pragmatism” than newly born and evolving.
DuBois' appraoch to pragmatism was based upon searches for

meaning and truth.

Owing to his unique intellectual, social,

and cultural background, even when compared to the other

Black students, who had preceded him as undergraduates at
Harvard, a distinct pragmatic theory of meaning was offered.

*Instructor of DuBois.

CHAPTER

IV

DUBOIS AS AN EPISTEMOLOGIST
(The study of human history begins with an investigation
of men and events whose names have been recorded and
preserved
for posterity.
The study of the effect of those events and
the meaning of the terms and concepts, used to describe them
and the thoughts of the men and women involved, is a study
of what we know, i.e. a study of knowledge.
In the academic
pursuits, found within the discipline of philosophy, the
study of knowledge is called "epistemology”
William
Edward Burghardt DuBois investigated a body of human knowledge by means of the meaning of terms and concepts which
he believed to be generally held and accepted by those who
used and applied such terms and concepts. He took his
training, in the discipline of philosophy, and applied it
to the investigation of the problems of race relations,
W.E.B. DuBois, I claim, was an epistemologist
His name,
however, is not found in the "Index", nor is his name
mentioned in any discussion within the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
I believe this is a serious omission.
This
Chapter is written to claim:
DuBois was indeed a
1)
'philosopher' in the academic sense of the term;, and 2)
that DuBois, more specifically, was an epistemologist who
offered important insights into the studies of knowledge
and truth, which even today are overlooked.)
.

.

.

DuBois' Background

During the years 1894-1909 DuBois was determined to

accomplish one goal.

He was determined to become a

'classic figure', e.g. Aristotle, Socrates, Homer, Virgil,
etc..

DuBois' early interest lay with the men who had

defined concepts of the ages past.

The influence of these

ancient thinkers was important, but, unlike them, DuBois
further determined that he would have to be the reporter,
the sculptor, the biographer, the translator, the doctor;
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all of these for himself and by himself.

The aid of the

societies' institutions, which had offered their
nominal

benefits to the classic figures of the ages, was not
available to DuBois.
The task of a man designing to become
a

'classic'

figure is rarely considered today.

expertise have broadened too greatly.

The areas of

The task of a Negro

being remembered or planning to be remembered as a classic
figure during the last quarter of the nineteenth century
was unthought of, except by DuBois.

DuBois accepted the

challenge to formally study that human trait of assigning
meanings to terms and concepts.

It was within that process

of assigning meanings that DuBois claimed racism was to be

uncovered.

With a study of the processes of naming and

defining, DuBois planned to show the injustices racism

perpetuated within interracial associations.

DuBois assured

himself that if he could add to the body of human knowledge
he would be remembered as a classic figure.

DuBois' con-

tribution to the body of human knowledge was presenting a

corrected and more accurate definition of racism.
Racism Defined

Racism had come to be understood in the last score
years of the nineteenth century as the suppression of one
race by another race with the subsequent racial relationship to primarily benefit the suppressor.

Racism would not

be a moral wrong if there was a suggestion, no matter how
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slight, that the race oppressed and suppressed was diff erent

from the oppressor

m

more meaningful ways other than

external and physical features.

This claim, for example,

is attacked in the following which appeared under "Editoral",

CRISIS

,

vol

.

1,

No.

2,

December 1910:
The Inevitable

In the argument of the prejudice there
is a certain usual ending:

is inevitable."

"But this

For instance, a crime

is committed by you.

I

am lynched.

"It

is inevitable," cries the bystander,

"they were both Negroes."

A brown man

is admitted to a theatre, misbehaves

apply for a ticket

and is ejected.

I

and am refused.

"It is inevitable,"

sighs the manager, "you are brown."

A yellow man is a fool; therefore,
Smith, who is also yellow, is treated

like an idiot.

"I am sorry,"

remarks

the policeman, but they are both yellow."

What is the real argument in these
cases?

It is this:

"People who resemble

each other in one important respect ought
to resemble each other in all important

respects and therefore be treated alike.
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If by any chance they do not so resemble

each other, this is unfortunate, for the
same treatment must be meted out.

inevitable

This is

.

Is it?

It is not inevitable.

is a criminal injustice.

It

It is inhuman

treatment and it is socially dangerous.
It is based on the unscientific assumption

that human beings who resemble each other
in one important particular,

like color

of skin, resemble each other in all par-

ticulars.

This is patently false.

More-

over, the social condemnation of an un-

desirable act or character loses all
force or reason when it is directed

against one who has not committed the
act or has not the condemned character.
To allow the mistreatment of wuch an

innocent man
it,

— to

condone it or defend

is not inevitable;

it is a crime.'*'

DuBois later argues that racism is the predication of the

exercise of power, by

a

group over another group, when the

dominant group believes that there is
ference between the two.

a

significant dif-

Racism, additional, demanded

that the dominant group argue, without definitive evidence.
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that there existed a possibility that meaningful differences

could be found between the races represented by each group.
DuBois faced a body of statements which argued that there
indeed existed a significant difference, i.e. that there

were races of men which exampled a more highly developed

human than were other races.

DuBois presented a definitive

response, supported by research, denying that there was
a

difference of significance.
For example, suppose that an issue of concern within

a national community, made up of peoples from several

different races, creates

a

question of such importance that

the question's not being answered threatens the lives and

well-being of at least one of the involved races of that
nation.

Suppose further that a decision needs to be made

to carry on those activities which will lead to the settling

of the question.

Suppose it is also the case that the

answer to the question is continually alleged not to be

known by the authorities of the controlling, non-threatened
group.

DuBois suggested that, in such a case, actions,

predicated on the possibility that the answer would be "true",
are wrong just as much at the time committed, when only the

possibility of their wrongness was present, as when the
answer 'false' is realized of the question.

Until DuBois the

question, "Is there a difference of significance between the

Caucasian and Negroid races?" was unsettled.

The Western
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European peoples and their societies were predicated upon
the assumption that there was the possibility that races

were different.

DuBois argued that that claim was not

available to racism's defenders.

To support his claim

DuBois embarked upon scienfitic investigation of race

relations and evolution.

DuBois planned an investigation

of the histories of selected races.

Each race was to be

scientific examined, as understood within the terms of
scientific investigation of the late nineteenth century.
If the races were meaningfully similar there would be

evidence gathered from this search.

Thus there would be

material to counter the claims of 'possible' inferiority
of a race.

For the African people DuBois had to reconstruct

much of their history.

The beginning of the project to

reconstruct the history of Africa was undertaken as an act
of love.

The benefits of such an investigation would add

to the broadening body of knowledge about peoples.

Thus, DuBois purposefully undertook studies of recorded

history.

He examined the meaning of words of past and

present cultures. An example of DuBois' examination of
word is the following:
SOCIAL EQUALITY
/

At last we have a definition of the very

elusive phrase "Social Equality" as
applied to the Negro problem.

In stating

a
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their grievances colored people have

recently specified these points:
1.

Disfranchisement, even on
educated Negroes.

2

Curtailment of common school
training

.

3.

Confinement to Ghettoes.

4.

Discrimination in wages,

5.

Confinement to menial employment.

6.

Systematic insult of their women.

7.

Lynching and miscarriage of justice.

8.

Refusal to recognize fitness "in
political or industrial life."

9.

Personal discourtesy.

Southern papers in Charlotte, Richmond, New
Orleans and Nashville have with singular

unanimity hastened to call this complaint
an unequivocal demand for "social equality",

and as such absolutely inadmissible.

We

are glad to have always suspected this

smooth phrase.

We recommend on this showing

that hereafter colored men who have hastened
to disavow any desire for "social equality"

should carefully read the above list of

disabilities which social inequality would
seem to prescribe.
(CRISIS, Vol

,

1,

No.

3,

January 1911)
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DuBois and Race

DuBois had carried on studies, between the years 18851894, on the campuses of Fisk, Harvard, and the University
of Berlin in which subjects and topics of classical history

had been insightfully presented.

To that, which was depicted

as a continuum of history, i.e, the history of Western

Culture, DuBois pieced together a parallel line of history
of African peoples.

The shards of DuBois' archaeological

dig were items which had been recorded within Western history which, though, small and seemingly unconnected, sug-

gested hints of uncovered past thought.

DuBois developed

tools to look beyond and behind the physical evidence and

reported on those statements which reflected African
thought.

These statements, which reported the African view

of the world, answered to two truth conditions, i.e. the

statements were either true or false.

DuBois suggested,

however, that with every statement which was asserted

about peoples of African lineage, came three, rather than
two truth claims.

The three claims were that the statement

was either true, false, or possible (with the claim of the

possible siding with the answer desired by the questioner)

Without access to the claim that it is possible that the
African is less human than other races, the force of the
arguments of racism was lost.

71

What is at stake here is my claim that DuBois determined
that it was an important task to demonstrate that complexity
of thought, which seemed to be the argument of those who

desired to mark a difference between races, was not vouchsafed to a race.

By showing that complexity of thought was

general among people and not peculiar to a race, DuBois
could then claim that racism was the predication of action

designed to bring about the destruction and genocide of the
history of a people.

For example DuBois asked, of an African

song sung to him during his early childhood, "What is
its meaning?"

Though not trained in music, he recognized

that the songs of the African, as exampled by the one sung
to him,

accurately recorded one understanding, one con-

sciousness, of the relationship which man had had with that

which was beyond himself, i.e. metaphysical expressions.
Could it be that periods of human history, which are marked
by a particular consideration of a philosophic issue

(e.g,

examine, in detail, structures and implications of certain

statements; complexity of thought) were not determined by
a race of a

people at a given time.

However, if this his-

tory, which is recorded human thought, is obscurred, then

argument asserting

a

possibility of meaningful difference

existing between races is given support, i.e. there is
no evidence to the contrary.

The 'possibility' of such

difference had to be dispelled.

The question whether or

not there did exist a meaningful difference between races.
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especially as it concerned African peoples, could no longer
remained unsettled.

In particular, American citizens had

to be shown that the slave trade from 1638-1870, and all

American institutions which sprung from the slave institution.
was founded and supported by this claim.

America, merely

as a representative of Western Culture continued to believe

of the possibility that Western science and thought was to

prove itself superior over other races.

This belief lead

-'N

to the following paradox:

W.E.B. DuBois is a Negro.

(T)

1

(F)

2.

W.E.B. DuBois is a Caucasian.

(T)

3.

W.E.B. DuBois is not a Negro.

(T)

4.

W.E.B. DuBois is not a Caucasian.

.

If the truth values noted in the left hand margin are to

hold, it is probable that 1-4 must have come from some

proposition such as the following:
(T

F)

&

5.

W.E.B. DuBois is a Negro and
W.E.B. DuBois is a Caucasian.

Since DuBois was descended from African, Dutch, and French

ancestors then we can only achieve the falsity of
the proposition

(5)

offering itself as

a

(2)

by

contradiction.

So what is the relationship which holds between the two

races which so firmly suggests that there is a definitive

answer to the question, "What proportion of Negro to

Caucasian ancestry does it take to denote that individual
is a Negro?"

As of 1967, intermarriage between Negro and

73

Caucasian was forbidden in seventeen
Delaware

Missouri and Oklahoma.

,

(17)

states including

This act of marriage was

punishable with fines up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to
five

years.

(5)

It had been after World War II, that four-

teen states west of the Mississippi had repealed such laws.

Undoubtedly, as these seventeen states in 1967 demonstrated,
the proportion was not important, the merest trace of Negro

blood was enough for the marking.

To attack this thought

DuBois employed his pragmatic methods which were announced

before the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
on November 19, 1897.

"The speech outlined the theoretical

framework and practical means for studying the black race in

America."

DuBois' pragmatic principle, which was to be

applied to that study, is stated in 'Section

5:

A Program of

Future Study' of the speech entitled "The Study of The Negro
Problems"
The plan of study is without a doubt, long, difficult
and costly, and yet is not more than commensurable

with the size and importance of the subject with

which it is to deal.

It will take years and decades

to carry out such a plan, with the barest measure of

success, and yet there can be no doubt but this plan
or something similar to it, points to the quickest

path toward the ultimate solution of the present dif-

culties

4

The ultimate solution was to establish that the possibility
that there was a significant difference between races was

either true or false.

DuBois was descendent from African,

French Hugenot, and Dutch forefathers.

And yet he, and

those who had far less African blood, was considered Negro.

The study of the Negro problems was then designed to

accomplish two objectives:

1)

that though a social prob-

lem "is the failure of an organized social group to realize
its group ideals, through the inability to adapt a certain

desired line of action to given conditions of life, there
is not one Negro problem.

.

.

rather (the Negro problem) is

a plexus of social problems some new,

some complex.

some old, some simple,

These problems have their one bond of unity

in the act that they group themselves about these Africans

whom two centuries of slave-trading brought into the land;"'’
2)

that the presence of African heritage in the lineage of

any individual does not limit not separate that individual’s

humanness but points to an irrationality as concerns the
notion of human by which some argue for the existence of
such a separation.

To accomplish these objectives DuBois

undertook the task of completing
Negro.

a

scientific study of the

He offered his results to show that the contradic-

tion implied by the statement. The sentence 'W.E.B. DuBois
is a Negro and Caucasian’

is true,

is a result of laws and

social thought having been made "to fit a class distinguished
by its condition more than by its race or color."

The

body of researched material compiled by DuBois during his
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work on The Suppression of the Slave Trade to The United
§-

tates

^e^ca

,

1638 - 1870

;

The Philadelphia Negro

six-

;

teen (16) monographs published as The Atlanta Studies

,

(the

first attempts to scientifically study the problems of

Black people); and. The CRISIS

;

all this lead DuBois to

answer that there was no difference between races in any

meaningful way.

Consequently, if there was no difference

between races, then racism, based upon the possibility that
there was a difference was a wrong.

If there were no sig-

nificant differences between races, then it was a moral
wrong for one race to arbitrarily suppress another group
when the suppression was justified by false criteria.

The

actions, needed to bring about the elimination of racism,

were initiated and defined in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries by DuBois.

He based his definition upon

his epistemological interests and expressed his definitions
in keeping with his developed pragmatic principles.

An example of DuBois* adaptation of his pragmatic

principles, as applied to combating racism, is found in
his early editorials of The CRISIS magazine.

The CRISIS

functioned as the official news organ of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1910)
There were many influencial individuals involved in this

Association's creation.

However, what is indisputable is

that DuBois was the individual who had the greatest experi-

ence and the longest record of actively forming organizations
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and developing programs to fight the encroachments of racism

within American society.

The encroachment of racism ab-

normally restricted certain individuals' expressions of
personal choice, desire, will, volution, etc..
croachment, of course, became
upon a race of people.

a

This en-

restrictive element forced

The first "Editorial" of The CRISIS

Vol. One, No. One, November 1910, contained the following

two articles:
THE CRISIS

The object of this publication is to set forth

those facts and arguments which show the danger
of race predjudice, particularly as manifested

today toward colored people.

It takes its

name from the fact that the editors believe
that this is a critical time in the history
of the advancement of men.

Catholicity and

tolerance, reason and forebearance can today

make the world-old dream of human brotherhood

approach realization; while bigotry and prejudice, emphasized race consciousness and force

can repeat the awful history of the contacts
of nations and groups in the past.

We strive

for this higher and broader vision of Peace and

Good Will.
The policy of The CRISIS will be simple
and well-defined.

,
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It will first and foremost be a news-

paper:

it will record important happenings

and movements in the world which bear on
the great problem of interracial relations,

and especially those which effect the Negro-

American
Secondly, it will be a review of opinion
and literature, recording briefly books,

articles, and important expressions of opinion
in the white and colored press on the race

problem.
Thirdly, it will publish a few short

articles
Finally, its editorial pages will stand
for the rights of men, irrespective of color
or race.

For the highest ideals of American

democracy, and for reasonable but earnest and

persistent attempt to gain these rights and
realize these ideals.

The magazine will be

the organ of no clique or party and will

avoid personal rancor of all sorts.

In the

absence of proof to the contrary it will
assume honesty or purpose on the part of all
men. North and South, white and black.

7

AGITATION
Some good friends of the cause we represent
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fear agitation.

They say:

not make a noise; work."

agitate— do

"Do not

They add, "Agitation

is destructive or at best negative

— what

is

wanted is positive constructive work."
Such honest critics mistake the function
of agitation.

A toothache is agitation.

a toothache a good thing?

useless?

No.

No.

Is

Is it therefore

It is supremely useful,

for it

tells the body of decay, dyspepsia and death.

Without it the body would suffer unknowingly.
It would think:

All is well, when lo!

danger

lurks
The same is true of the Social Body.

Agitation is

a

necessary evil to tell of the

ills of the Suffering,

Without it many a

nation has been lulled to false security and

preened itself with virtues it did not
possess
The function of this Association is to
tell this nation the crying evil of race

prejudice.
one.

It is a hard duty but a necessary

It is Pain; Pain is not good but Pain

is necessary.

Pain does not aggravate disease

Disease causes Pain.

Aggravation

Agitation does not mean

— Aggravation

calls for Agitation

in order that Remedy may be found.

g
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The argument presented in "Agitation" is of some interest;
i)

A toothache is agitation,

ii)

A toothache is not a good thing,

iii)

Not a good thing is not useless,

iv)

Therefore, a toothache is not useless.

DuBois continues the argument by stating that the usefulness
of a toothache is in its telling the "body of decay, dys-

pepsia and death" within it.

Within the Social Body the

agitation can only be carried on by individuals.
is Pain.

Agitation

DuBois’ use of Pain as a metaphor for 'Agitation',

should be allowed various interpretations.

To present these

various interpretations, before the reading public, demanded
that DuBois begin his own publications.

DuBois gave some

form to his developed philosophical positions within the

limitations of the purposes of the particular journal,

magazine or newspaper.

The CRISIS

:

A Record of the Darker

Races, during DuBois' term as editor (1910-1934), had more

impact upon twentieth century America than any other magazine.

The CRISIS reflected the spectrum of experiences had

by some who suffered here in the United States.

When we

examine DuBois' work we confirm his claim that he applied

philosophy to the study of the problems of race relations,
DuBois was determined to make a career of philosophy.

We

are told that at both undergraduate institutions he attended,

influential men in his academic experience tried to dissuade
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him from seeking a career in philosophy.
As an undergraduate,

I

had talked frankly

with William James about teaching philosophy,
my major subject.

He discouraged me, not by

means because of my record in his classes.
He used to give me A's and even an A-plus,

but as he said candidly, there is "not much
chance for anyone earning a living as a philosopher."

He was repeating just what Chase of

Fisk had said a few years previously.
I

knew by this time (1892) that practically

my sole chance of earning a living combined

with study was to teach, and after my work with
Hart in United States history,

I

conceived the

idea of applying philosophy to an historical

interpretation of race relations.
In other words,

I

was trying to make my

first steps toward sociology as the science
of human action.

It goes without saying that

no such field of study was then recognized at

Harvard or came to be recognized for 20 years
after

9

CHAPTER

V

CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS OF DUBOIS' PRAGMATISM
(The testing of a theory of truth involves presenting
arguments which offer differing points of concern.
In this
Chapter I argue that problems of the color-line faced today
may be addressed using DuBois' guidelines.
I also argue
that DuBois' pragmatic approach may yet bring benefits.)
,

A Modern Argument of Possibility
In his January 8,

1980, nationally syndicated column,

James J. Kilpatrick discussed the "Perspective needed on
the King Holiday Bill".

The topic concerned the efforts

of some Congressmen to have a national holiday designated
in January to honor Dr. Martin L. King, Jr..

Of interest

to this discussion are the two arguments advanced against

the bill which Kilpatrick found convincing:
It is wrong simply as a matter of public policy

apart from Dr. King, to accord permanent public

honors to any person until a sufficient time
has elapsed to put his achievements in per-

spective.

Secondly the bill would make Dr.

King the only American in the whole of our

history to have

a

national holiday.'*'

The Morning Union 1/8/80 Springfield, MA

The first argument echoes the argument of possibility pre-

sented earlier, i.e. it is possible that Dr. King's
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achievements will be found less than "our" standard.

Yet,

the possibility that Dr. King will measure up to a standard

Kilpatrick seems unwilling to consider.

About Robin Beard's

amendment, which would designate the third Sunday in every

January for formal observance," Kilpatrick states, "The
Beard amendment is honor enough.
at that."

I

would let the matter go

This too easily eliminates the consideration that

if after a "sufficient time has elapsed" and Dr. King's

achievements have lasted unchallenged, then the permanent
public honors would be rightly placed.

Similarly, the

honors would have proved as rightly placed and given if

nationally conferred and recognized at this time.
Within the second argument, "the bill would make Dr.
King the only American in the whole of our history to have
a

national holiday," there is a hint of the narrow Jamesian

use of the third person possessive pronoun "our".

It may

be inferred from Kilpatrick's statement that the problem
is not that Dr. King would be the only American in the

whole of our history to have a national holiday in his
honor, rather the larger problem seems to be that, in the

honoring of Dr. King, attention would be focussed on those
areas of American history which American society is still

not yet ready to recognize.

public address in

In Dr. King's last major

Carnei^gte Hall,

February 23, 1968, on the

centennial of DuBois birth, Dr. King spoke to this inference
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found in statements similar to Kilpatrick's notion of the

"whole of our history".
.

.

.

it would be well to remind white America

°f its debt to Dr. DuBois.

When they corrupted

Negro history they distorted American history

because Negroes are too big a part of the

building of this nation to be written out of
it without destroying scientific history.

White America, drenched with lies about
Negroes, has lived long in a fog of ignorance.
Dr.

DuBois gave them

a

gift of truth for which

they should eternally be indebted to him.

2

"Honoring Dr. DuBois" 2/23/68 Dr. Martin L.
King, Jr.
We are told by Kilpatrick that "Washington’s Birthday is

lawfully 'President's Day'.

Kilpatrick's mentioning of this

would seem to shift the concentration from considering the
individual, Washington, to the consideration of the symbolic
use of Washington to bring the honor of the public to all

Presidents following and including him.

This honor is a

gesture of respect that is paid to those who have been
elected into the nation's highest office.
standard bearers.

These are elected

In honoring one name, we honor not them

all individually, but the office they have shared succesIn honoring him we

sively,

Similarly it is with Dr. King.

do

as Kilpatrick claims, honor "an American",

not,

In
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honoring Dr. King we honor all who have shared the office
of Negro Leader, all who have been the standard bearers.

Foremost among them we would honor Dr. DuBois.
The question, which faced DuBois, and the other

standard bearers of the Negro cause, was, "What was the

supposed threat that the Negro presented to the white?"
At bottom the supposed threat which caused the greatest

alarm was miscegenation.

(Miscegenation is understood to

be taken in its broadest terms.)

Miscegenation was not

only the mixture of races through social and sexual intercourse, but, also, miscegenation was the intermingling of

races via a violation of space which was valued by the
"You're on my land!"

possessor of that space.
country!"

"This is our community!"

my neighborhood!"

"I

don't want them marrying my

From this grouping of statements, the last has

particular interest.
reference.

don't want them in

"And the next thing you know is that they

are living next door!"

daughter!"

"I

"This is my

The unwanted group is given plural

The supposedly desired object is metaphorically

and symbolically given singular reference,

my daughter

.

the
"My daughter" is all women, she is the embodiment of

female image in which resided the purity of the race.
socieSlavery, war, murder, armed rebellion destruction of

concurrent
ties have sprung from this and related and/or
to protect
images which many groups of people have sought
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and possess.

In this manner, carried to further extremes,

this continent of North America, by right of conquest and

development, had fallen to whites.

DuBois responded to

this basic argument of territorial possession by claiming

that white Americans could not claim this land, the moulding
of American Society, nor the building of any of these insti-

tutions.

White America could not claim any of these with-

out recognizing and respecting similar, and as forceful,
claims of possession and protection made by the Black American.

In DuBois 1900 lecture,

"The Negro in the South and

in the North", we find the first printed usage of,

"The

problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line."

For the next three years this essay and

thirteen others were written and then gathered together
under the cover. The Souls of Black Folk

.

Because this

work argued against the idea of the white American having
a

claim on all that America had developed, without respect-

ing the claims of the Black American, it is often suggested

that it was written primarily for the white reading public
of 1903.
.

.

.

it is a classic culmination of DuBois’

thought at that time

.

.

.

This volume is

written primarily for a white audience and
though some of what is said is outdated, it
still powerfully exemplifies the fierce belief
in man's willingness to reason with man.

3

86

This suggestion is not entirely appropriate.

The open-

ing paragraph in "The Forethought" reads:

HEREIN lie buried many things which if read

with patience may show the strange meaning
of being black here at the dawning of the

Twentieth Century.

This meaning is not

without interest to you. Gentle Reader;
for the problem of the Twentieth Century
is the problem of the color line.

I

pray

you then, receive my little book in all
charity, studying my words with me, for-

giving mistake and foible for the sake of
the faith and passion that is in me, and
4
seeking the grain of truth hidden there.

The direct address form,

Black reading public.

I

suggest, was intended for the

DuBois presented to the Black reading

public a form of argument which he believed would be
for other Blacks to use in arguing against racism.

a

model

Racism's

effects upon the actions of the people were evidenced through
the justifications of actions practiced within the society.

Once the areas affected by racism were recognized a Black
onslaught

could better protect himself and family from the
of racist actions.

DuBois' work which outlined and detailed

the argument in full was The Souls of Black Folk

.

There

was much factual material within the reading of The Souls
of Black Folk.

More factual material than could be taken
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in by a reader without long study.

Nevertheless DuBois

presented to the casual reader melodies and refrains, both
figuratively and literally, of the experiences found within
the souls of Black folk,

DuBois began each essay by trans-

cribing the staff, key, meter, notes and rest notations of
a "Sorrow Song".

They that walked in darkness sang songs in
the olden days - Sorrow Songs

were weary at heart.

thought that
I

I

-

for they

And so before each

have written in this book

have set a phrase, a haunting echo of

these weird songs in which the soul of
cr

the black slave spoke to men.

The argument supporting the claim, made by some

Americans, that it is a right of those who have possessions
to protect those possessions may be presented as follows:
If one claims possession of a thing,
has a right to protect that thing.

then one

If a race claims possession of a social or cultural
institution, then it is the right of that race to

protect that institution.
If a possession is one which is to be protected,
then it is of value to the possessor.
If one claims the right to protect,
claims the right to possess.

then one

The things which one possesses are claimed by
right of invention, origination, and/or conquest.
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The force of this argument was gotten from the belief that
the American society was founded upon and fashion from those

things developed from European settlers.

DuBois decided

to argue against such argument by claiming that even if it

were valid, it would be invalid, thus not a valid argument.
The argument line which DuBois used against such thought is

found within The Souls of Black Folk

There he argued that

.

there was little present to the members of American white

society which did not also owe some indebtedness to the
African.

This argument first appeared in Atlantic Monthly

,

August 1897, entitled, "Strivings of the Negro People":
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek
and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the

Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with
a veil,

and gifted with second-sight in

this American world.
his twoness,

-

.

.

One ever feels

an American, a Negro; two

souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled

strivings; two warring ideals in one dark

body

.

These statements may have been of interest to a white reader.
On the other hand the meaning gathered by a Black reader
was striking.

To the Black reader DuBois argued that the
os.

n c^v

'A

reason why the Black reader was anger, and anxious, throughhad
out much of his life was that the American white society

attempted to divide that reader.

The division was brought
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about by the white society not wanting the African as an

African but rather as that society determined the position
and place the African was to occupy.

Black had become

a

In that attempt the

person who retained part of the person

he would naturally be but could not be within the society,

and there was a part that the white society had attempted
to force upon the African which the African could never be.

Thus the anxiety and anger stemmed from the fact that the

Black American could not be that which the white American
desired.

The Black American could only be a participant

within American society in which he shared an equal opportunity to participate.
The history of the American Negro is the

history of this strife,

-

this longing to

attain self conscious manhood, to merge his

double self into a better and truer self.
In this merging he wishes neither of the

older selves to be lost.

He would not

Africanize America, for America has too
much to teach the world and Africa.

He

would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood
of white Americanism,

for he knows that

Negro blood has a message for the world.
He simply wishes to make it possible for

American,
a man to be both a Negro and an

without being cursed and spit upon by his
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fellows, without having the doors of

Opportunity closed roughly in his face. 7
In 1897 many Blacks who read those lines had experienced

that anxiety described.

Never before had they been told

from what or why the anxiety and anger stemmed.

passages also suggest that DuBois had
at issue here, a concern for the

people.

a

These

related interest

'mental health' of the

DuBois here addressed that process of thought

which presented the emotions to the consciousness.

The

Black reader was asked to recall personal experiences and
events of anger; anger in response to the insults endured
daily.

The anger a Black experienced when called "nigger"

was an anger which sprung from the understanding that there

was no such thing as a "nigger" as conceived in
society.

racist

a

What an American Black was, was not a "nigger".

What the Black American sought rightly to achieve, to be
sharing partner within American society, was not

a

a

"nigger".

Only that image which American white society had tried to
force upon the African, as perceived by the white American,
was a "nigger".

The anger which the Black experienced

promised only to continue.

And so The Souls of Black Folk

spoke eloquently to a white audience as it also spoke force-

fully to a Black audience.

Before the white audience, Du-

Bois presented factual material which displayed evidence

audience DuBois
of the anger which existed. Before the Black
reading.
presented material which demanded more than casual
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"I pray you

receive my little book in all charity, studying

my words with me
den there

." 8

,

.

.

and seeking the grain of truth hid-

(Forethought)

Within The Souls of Black Folk

DuBois argued that Blacks did not threaten the cultural

institutions of American white society.

Within The Souls

of Black Folk DuBois argued when, and only when, the Negro

was recognized as an equal participant within the institutions of American society would American society be truly
In the following DuBois first begins by des-

realized.

cribing the importance and the gift of "The Sorrow Songs",
i.e. Negro spirituals; he then moves on to argue that the

Sorrow Song was not the only gift given by the Negro to

developing nation.

But because those other gifts are taken

for granted, the injustices perpetrated against the Negro
are allowed to continue:
.

.

.

Though all the sorrow of the Sorrow

Songs there breathes a hope

—a

ultimate justice of things

...

faith in the
Do the Sorrow

Songs sing true?
The silently growing assumption of this
age is that the probation of races is past, and

that the backward races of today are of proven
inef f iency and not worth the saving

.

Such an

assumption is the arrogance of peoples irreverent toward Time and ignorant of the deeds
of men.

A thousand years ago such an assumption,
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easily possible, would have made it difficult for the Teuton to prove his right
to life.

Two thousand years ago such dog-

matism, readily welcome, would have scouted
the idea of blood races ever leading civil-

izations.

So woefully unorganized is socio-

logical knowledge that the meaning of progress, the meaning of "swift" and "slow" in

human doing, and the limits of human perfectability, are veiled, unanswered sphinxes
on the shores of science.

Why should

Aeschylus have sung two thousand years before
Shakespeare was born?

Why has civilization

flourished in Europe, and flickered, flamed,
and died in Africa?

So long as the world

stands meekly dumb before such questions,
shall this nation proclaim its ignorance
and unhallowed prejudices by denying free-

dom of opportunity to those who brought the
Sorrow Songs to the Seats of the Mighty?
Your country?

How came it yours?

Be-

fore the Pilgrims landed we were here.

Here we have brought our three gifts and

mingled them with yours;
and song

— soft,

a

gift of story

stirring melody in an

ill-harmonized and unmelodious land; the
gift of sweat and brawn to beat back the

wilderness, conquer the soil, and lay the

foundations of this vast economic empire
two hundred years earlier than your weak

hands could have done it; the third, a

gift of the Spirit.

Around us the history

of the land has centered for thrice a

hundred years; out of the nation's heart
we have called all that was best to

throttle and subdue all that was worst;
fire and blood, prayer and sacrifice,

have billowed over this people, and they
have found peace only the the altars of
the God of Right.

Nor has our gift of the

Spirit been merely passive.

Actively we

have woven ourselves with the very warp
and woof of this nation,

— we

fought their

battles, shared their sorrow, mingled our

blood with theirs, and generation after

generation have pleaded with

a

headstrong,

careless people to despise not Justice,
Mercy, and Truth, lest the nation be

smitten with a curse.

Our song, our toil,

our cheer, and warning have been given to
this nation in blood-brotherhood.

Are not
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these gifts worth the giving?

work and striving?

Is not this

Would America have been

America without her Negro people?

LAST WORD
During the years 1965-1970 a body of American students,
whose number has yet to be determined, experienced trauma
on their college campuses.

The cause of the trauma was

American society’s institutions of higher learning reacting
badly when they attempted to confront full-face the problem
of the color-line which existed within them.

Just as the

effects of exposure to doses of radiation larger than 50
REMS will measurably affect a human in time, so have the

effects of the traumatic collegiate experience taken time
to show.

Bois,

Some of the students of the sixties, who read Du-

are beginning to show the benefit from the study of

However, the

those same lessons now in the eighties.

interest which this Master’s Thesis has addressed is not
that the lessons gathered from DuBois' sociological studies

remain to be learned and applied, though this is true.

The

interest rather has been in the philosophical manner DuBois
chose to present those lessons.

This,

I

have argued, was

not done by chance nor coincidence but, rather, was an ex

pression of

a

disciplined process of thought one might ex-

pect of a trained nineteenth century philosopher.
bears
An example of a lesson offered by DuBois which

carried on,
upon discussions and research presently being
found in a
and is also philosophic food for thought, is
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March 1928, CRISIS

.

DuBois had received a "Letter to the

Editor" which complained of the CRISIS’ constant use of the

word "Negro".

The letter further voiced a hope that the

use of the word "Negro", i.e. to designate Americans of

African descent, would one day be abolished.

DuBois answered

the letter with:

My dear Roland:
Do not at the outset of your career make

the all to common error of mistaking names

for things.

Names are only conventional

signs for identifying things.
the reality that counts.

.

.

Things are
.

Moreover,

you cannot change the name of a thing at
will.

Names are not merely matters of

thought and reason; they are growths and
habits.

.

.

.

The point DuBois makes, and the lesson which is being offered
as concerns the word "Negro", is that it is not a person of

some skin color that the name picks out.

"Negro" is a thing

of reality, a thing of history, a thing whose history should
be appreciated.

The word "Negro", and that thing which it

designates, shares of truth and reality as do the words
"Caucasian", "Anglo-Saxon", "Mongol", "German", and so on.
However, the recently designed tests and expressed attitudes,

which argue that there are differences between things desigthat
nated by these words, are predicated on the assumption
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the tests' results and the statements which offer support
to

some accepted attitude can be generalized.
the generalization of the tests'

The target of

results and attitudinal

expressions, in some cases, is a group of people who sup-

posedly share similar skin color and thus similar mental
apti tudinal traits.

An argument such as this, DuBois claims,

is an argument of racism.
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